Already logged into the corporate network, he immediately deleted the corporate encryption key ring. "As he was hitting the delete key, security and his manager showed up and said, 'Stop what you're doing right now, and step away from the terminal,'" according to Heimerl. But it was too late.
The file held all the encryption keys for the company, including the escrow key, a master key that allows the company to decrypt any file of any employee. Most employees kept their own encryption keys on their local systems. However, the key ring held the only copies of encryption keys for about 25 employees -- most of whom worked in the legal and contracts departments -- and the only copy of the corporate encryption key. That meant that anything those employees had encrypted in the three years since they had started using the encryption system was permanently indecipherable -- and thus, virtually lost to them.
Cost to the company
Heimerl hasn't calculated how much money the incident cost the company, but he estimates the loss of the key ring file amounted to about 18 person-years of lost productivity, which takes into account both the work that went into creating files that are now permanently encrypted and the time devoted to re-creating materials from drafts, old e-mails and other unencrypted documents.
Preventive measures
Focusing only on what happened after they discovered the rogue Web site, the company made two crucial mistakes, says Heimerl. It should have shut down Phil's access immediately upon discovering his activities. But managers also left themselves vulnerable by not keeping a secure backup of critical corporate information. (Ironically, the company thought the key ring was so sensitive that no copies should be made.)
The best defense is multipronged
The overall lesson from these horror stories is that no one single thing can protect you from rogue IT people. You might have great technical security -- like the multitiered security system that ultimately detected Phil's unauthorized Web site -- and yet a simple mistake by HR can lead to disaster. There could be big red flags in terms of behavior or personality that go unnoticed -- like Sally's missing laptops.
It's a combination of technical safeguards and human observation that offers the best protection, says CERT's Cappelli.
And yet it's hard to convince companies to do both. Executives tend to think such problems can be solved by technology alone, at least partly because they hear vendors of monitoring tools and other security-minded software claiming that their tools offer protection. "We're trying to figure out how to get the message to the C-level people that this is not just an IT problem," she says.
It's a difficult message to hear. And a lesson that many companies don't learn except the hard way. Even if more companies were forthcoming with the details of their horror stories, most CEOs would still think it could never happen to them. Until it does.
Frequent Computerworld contributor Tam Harbert is a Washington, D.C.-based writer specializing in technology, business and public policy. She can be contacted through her Web site, TamHarbert.com.