Using Data We Have to Improve Data We Get

Computerworld - It's budget time, and my work is cut out for me. Let's face it: As a security manager in the IT department of a company that isn't in the security field, I'm not exactly generating revenue. Most of the budget goes to the engineers who make the equipment my company sells for millions of dollars.

This is my first budget season at this company. When I started, the budget was already set, and my share was pitiful. That's to be expected; there hadn't been a security manager on staff for over a year. But I want to do better this year.

I will have an opportunity to make my pitch to upper management for funding the information security department. This presentation must be concise and easy to understand while explaining my objectives, the current state of affairs and the ramifications of not having funding. Then I will put a dollar figure on each item. I don't expect to get all the money I want, but if my justifications are convincing, I could end up with enough to satisfy my top priorities.

Each item on my wish list will have a justification spelled out on a single slide. But in case I'm asked to expand on those justifications, I will also have supporting metrics derived from infrastructure that we've installed since I came on board.

For example, I want to expand our intrusion-detection system (IDS). Currently, we are able to monitor only about 40% of our network, and I want to get as close to 100% coverage as possible. In arguing for the money to do that expansion, I can point to the amount of malicious code, hacking activity and acceptable-use policy violations our current coverage already detects. I will explain that malicious code isn't always stopped or even detected by virus protection and that IDS is a great backup in this area. Malicious code has been the source of several Severity 1-type incidents for us over the past several months, sometimes requiring days to clean up after the damage caused by worms on our desktop network. IDS can pick up anomalous behavior, and we can use the signatures to help detect and mitigate this type of activity.

IDS is also useful in detecting attempts by both outsiders and employees to compromise our network, and the metrics we have from the 40% of our network that's covered illustrates that such attacks are all too frequent.

Finally, IDS has helped us keep tabs on acceptable-use policy violations, including the use of peer-to-peer file-sharing programs and online games, that consume our network bandwidth, hurt employee productivity and, in the case of file sharing of copyright-protected software and music, have the potential to cause legal problems.