July 26, 2004
(Computerworld)
Because of the failure of automated supply chain management and tracking systems in Iraq, U.S. Army combat units fighting there last year had to resort to capturing key supplies such as lubricants and explosives from enemy stockpiles, according to a review of the war that was written by military analysts.
In addition, food supplies barely met demand, and stocks of ammunition and spare parts were nearly depleted during combat, wrote analysts at the Center for Army Lessons Learned, a military think tank that's sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and based at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
After studying the Iraq war up to the fall of Baghdad, the CALL analysts found that the performance of logistics and supply chain operations were "barely above subsistence level," in large part because of problems with software based on radio frequency identification technology (RFID) and network communications.
The logistics problems were among the findings detailed in a 542-page book that resulted from the review of the war, which was commissioned by the Army's chief of staff. The book, titled On Point, was published by the Army in late May. It is posted on CALL's Web site but can't be printed, downloaded or copied.
There is no one answer to why the logistics failures occurred, said Gregory Fontenot, a retired Army colonel who was one of the three co-authors of the book. But, he added, "in my assessment, the biggest single problem was the communications issue."
The supply chain systems worked as expected until combat began in Iraq, after which the Army's network was quickly stretched too thin, according to Fontenot. "In a civilian organization, you establish connectivity before you move," he said. "We didn't have that luxury."
The Army did stress-testing on its battlefield systems before the war, but Fontenot said nothing could have fully prepared them to deal with fast-moving combat operations involving 150,000 troops and several million supply items.
The Army is already working to replace its 13 core logistics systems, which include several thousand applications, with a version of SAP AG's software tailored for defense operations. Lt. Col. Forrest Burke, a logistics network task force leader in the Army's G-4 logistics information branch, said the custom systems now in use date to the 1960s and 1970s and weren't written to be network-friendly.
Source of Frustration
If SAP's applications had been in place prior to the start of the war in Iraq, the Army simply could have installed an RFID module and "we'd be in business," Burke said. But he added that the communications infrastructure in Iraq was poor when the war began. "Probably our greatest frustration was the inability to connect all these legacy computers to the network," he said.
In addition, the Army was unable to start deploying transmitting devices with satellite dishes and readers that can pull information from RFID tags attached to supplies until just before the U.S. launched its attack. As a result, the ability of logistics managers to track supplies plummeted after the goods reached Iraq, Burke said.
Supply chain visibility has improved since then, according to Burke. He said that about 100 transmitters are now in place as part of RFID systems supplied by Savi Technology Inc. in Sunnyvale, Calif. In addition, IP-based satellite long-haul connections have been installed at all of the Army's supply warehouses in Iraq, and most of the RFID data traffic related to logistics is being moved to secure wireless LANs that are connected to the satellite links.
Another problem was that the logistics systems weren't flexible enough to deal with exceptions and glitches, Burke said. For example, if a combat unit unexpectedly changed its location, there was no way to reroute its supplies. The Army is discussing a possible resolution of that problem that would involve the installation of a customized version of SAP's CRM applications, said Burke.
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The Army's digital network showed unit positions and activities, allowing commanders to make decisions rapidly.