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Martin McKeay's picture
Martin McKeay

Security Matters

Diebold says "They're poor researchers"

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Rated +15
155 Votes

Diebold has responded to the criticism aimed at it by researchers at Princeton by attacking their professionalism and testing methods.  That's great, Diebold, but how about answering some of the actual concerns raise, rather than telling us what the Princeton researchers did wrong? Professor Felten has a good reputation in general and is well-known in the security community. Attacking him and his students isn't likely to win any points.  It also makes you look foolish, since people like me will draw attention to the fact you haven't answered the real question: Why haven't the Diebold machines been designed securely?

I'm not going to take the time to take apart Diebold President Dave Byrd's rebuttal, especially since it's been done pretty well already.  I will however add a third item to my list of requirements I have concerning what it would take to make the Diebold machines acceptable for public use:  Neutral, third-party auditing of the software and hardware. Personally, I would consider the work Professor Felten and his students have done would qualify as neutral, but obviously, Diebold doesn't. They don't like the Black Box Voting results either, I'd guess. 

Diebold may be a private company, but the service they're providing is consumed by the voting public.  As such, saying "It's secure, trust us" is not an acceptable answer.  This is not a situation where security through obscurity is an acceptable answer.  Not only do the results of each election have to be verifiable but how we arrived at those results also needs to be verifiable.  Code verification has been one of the most asked for requirements since the first evoting machine was developed.  There are very few situations where the saying "trust, but verify" applies more than in voting.

Here's my final comment, and it's directed right at Dave Byrd:  Quit attacking the critics of your product and attack the basic problems your product has continually displayed.  Rather than attacking researchers and running off election officials who want your products verified, take the time to address the fundamental problems with your products.  Give us a paper trail, quit using WindowsCE, allow verification of your software.  Part of being in a democratic society is that the voting process needs to be transparent to anyone who's willing to take the time to look.  Until Diebold is willing to accept thattransparency , you're going to keep getting hammered by your critics and your products will never be acceptable.  It's only going to get worse unless Diebold changes their tactics.

What People Are Saying

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Rated +16
118 Votes

The idea that people

The idea that people conducting a study lack some integrity discredits them is silly.

  1. The problem is not that people conducting a study announced that they can defeat the security measures in place.

    I'd be thrilled if all such attempts were published as the Princeton Study. The problem, of course, comes not from professors and researchers who may have conflicts-of-interest or fail to conform to the scientific standard. It comes from slimey people who, operating in the shadows, may (or already have) figured out how they can defeat the Diebold system and alter election outcomes.

  2. The concern is not whether the Princeton methodology is scientifically sound as it was precisely conducted, but whether a malevolent person (or group of people) can exploit weaknesses in the system, even in ways the Princeton team did not explore.

  3. Having the head of Diebold express denial about the potential that his machines may be vulnerable tells us all we need to know about whether our votes are being protected. Having him insist that all hackers meet some sort of "good citizen" test before they can steal votes tells us more than I want to know about the sanctity of the elections that Dave Byrd is the steward of.

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Rated +23
145 Votes

Oregon has used a

Oregon has used a vote-by-mail system for several years now. It is a paper system, obviously. It uses the same ScanTron forms that we all used to take tests with in grade school. The ballots are mailed out to everyone in advance of the election, giving people who didn't get a ballot for whatever reason a chance to get one. Ballots are sealed in a paper envelope that is in turn sealed in another envelope that the voter signs. Ballots can be mailed back in up to 3 days before the election, or taken to any post office the day of the election. The system is cheap, it works, and is overwhelmingly supported by the populace.

Electronic voting has one real purpose, to get the population comfortable with electronic voting. It makes no difference if today the machines are completely secure or not. The criminals that fix elections aren't going to tamper with any election now, until they get the electronic system institutionalized. Once that happens in another 15 years, the electronic machines today will be obsoleted, and will be replaced by new machines with new security holes which will be exploited to be used to fix elections.

Microsoft, one of the wealthiest companies on earth, cannot produce new versions of Windows every 3 years that aren't full of security holes. It is rediculous to think that Diebold, who has much less money and cannot afford to hire the top programming talent, could do better.

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Rated +28
142 Votes

Ben, What the Diebold

Ben,

What the Diebold machine does is not a paper trail in the way I meant it. They do indeed give a tally of the votes on a paper readout, but what I'm looking for is a piece of paper that is shown to the voter before they submit their final vote, and then placed in a locked box inside the evoting machine. I don't care if each vote is it's own piece of paper or it theres a ribon of paper, but I want a separate record of each vote on the paper and in the chip. And one recording method needs to be human readable.

So they're showing you a compilation of what's on the chip, just in a paper form. I want to see a second, human-readable output of each vote. I want something any layman can lay on the table and read without another piece of equipment.

Martin McKeay
martin_cw@mckeay.net
http://www.mckeay.net/
Voicemail: 916.231.9479

Rate this
Rated +17
127 Votes

Martin McKeay, on Fri,

Martin McKeay, on Fri, 09/15/2006 wrote
#|
... take time to address the fundamental problems with your products. Give us a paper trail, quit using WindowsCE, allow verification of your software.

|#

All in all, an excellent article on a crucial issue that's disturbingly absent in mainstream media reports. One correction though: as Felton's study showed, the Diebold evoting machine in question did give a paper trial, but the paper trail always faithfully reproduced the altered vote count. Unfortunately, there is no technological fix to the fundamental problem: the only vote counting process that can verified to be honest is one that enables citizens to oversee every step of the process - at least at the level of the local polling place. I think it should be self-evident that there is no practical way for the public to oversee the inner workings of an e-voting system. This should have become obvious much sooner - and would have - had there been widespread public debate on this issue before such e-voting systems were so implemented on such a disastrous scale and at enormous taxpayer expense.

The views of experts like Dr. Felton should have been sought out long ago.

Ben Olasov

Rate this
Rated +34
144 Votes

We are headed towards an

We are headed towards an absolute electoral meltdown this November. So far every election this year has been plagued with huge numbers of problems and glitches that have even resulted in several people (republicans even) that lost races in Iowa that have now been overturned by handcounts initiated by alert election officials that thought the computer results were odd. It ended up the ballots were programmed wrong.

Check bradblog.com for all the info on everything that's been happening for years in the electoral integrity arena. All the info there is verifiable. I think you might be surprised at just how many problems there are and have been with these horrendous machines.

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Rated +4
168 Votes

Saying about

Saying about non-professionalism is a first point to real amateur. But attack professor is at least silly. I don't understand Diebold. He thinks he's the best? I bet he not. It would be better if he started to communicate with professor without any attacks. Cooperation brought good results at all times.
Good luck all of you

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Rated +7
163 Votes

Has everyone forgot that the

Has everyone forgot that the president of Diebold once stated that he would do everything in his power to make sure G.W. was re-elected?

As far as the excuse of "computer" tabulated/collected votes are easily corrupted, they can easily be audited as well. What I mean by that, is the system can be as bad, or great, based upon its design and implementation. There should be no excuses. I can do my bank transactions, purchases, and transfers securely on-line. Quite frankly, there should be no excuses.

Rate this
Rated +38
124 Votes

As a techie I see no way to

As a techie I see no way to assure 100% avoidace of tech based voting fraud if computers collect the votes.

For tabulation (polling place results -> city totals, -> county totals -> state totals) we can publish Election-Judge signed text documents at all levels to multiple web sites (gov, GOP, DEM, LWV, Green, etc) for cross check and independent totalling. (Google & friends can total text file held results from all precincts pertty quick, yes?)

As a Citizen, with Citizen election judges, (think soccer Mom, small town USA, highschool only), the only vote collecting method a citizen election judge can personally verify as correct is a paper based system with multiple-party citizens counting. ALL OTHER OPTIONS require the Election Judge to rely on a 3rd party for trust. That trust is PROVEN to be impossible.

Check printing industry: here is your chance to step in with cheap, quickly printed ballots unique to a locale/event but still hard to cheat.

Trust in our elections is a requirement, "high tech" convenience is not. I would like to see Election Judge court challenges of all computer "assisted" voting methods.

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Rated -6
136 Votes

Tom Evans wrote #| As a

Tom Evans wrote

#|

As a Citizen, with Citizen election judges, (think soccer Mom, small town USA, highschool only), the only vote collecting method a citizen election judge can personally verify as correct is a paper based system with multiple-party citizens counting. ALL OTHER OPTIONS require the Election Judge to rely on a 3rd party for trust. That trust is PROVEN to be impossible.

|#

As a research programmer at a large medical university, I think what you've said is spot-on. Basically, any part of the vote-counting process that's concealed from the voter is an opportunity for vote tampering. And all actual e-vote counting processes are inherently concealed from the voter. Why some people think they can have any confidence in the count (or recount) of an election conducted with DREs is a mystery to me. Why some politicians have mandated the use e-voting in many elections is much less of a mystery.

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Rated +1
139 Votes

Yeah and I remember during

Yeah and I remember during days of paper ballots when Lyndon Johnson received votes from people buried in cemeteries. How quickly we forget. It's foolish to believe that a specific system is necessarily safer than another.