For all the talk by its CEO about a new and different Microsoft, the company's revenue and profit engines remain untouched, with money-making software groups tied to hardware-intensive divisions that increasingly drag down the firm's overall margin.
Perusing Microsoft's latest financial report, the one filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in July, makes it clear that little has changed in either the last year or since Satya Nadella took over the reins in February 2014.
Two of the company's six business units -- Devices & Consumer (D&C) Licensing and Commercial Licensing -- generated 68% of the company's total revenue for the second quarter of 2014 and 93% of its gross margin. Those units, as their names imply, primarily sell software licenses: Windows to OEMs in D&C's case, Office and a slew of other products, including Windows Server, to enterprises in Commercial's.
Those numbers were not substantially different from a year ago, much less six months ago when Nadella took over the company. In the second quarter of 2013, D&C and Commercial Licensing accounted for 75% of the revenue and 95% of the gross margin. Half a year ago, the figures were in the same ballpark: 66% and 93%.
And the D&C and Commercial Licensing margins were still stratospheric last quarter, 92% for D&C, 94% for Commercial. In other words, for each $100 brought in by those two units -- from software sales, in other words -- Microsoft retained $93.10. That's "printing money" by any business definition.
The other units -- Computing and Gaming (C&G) Hardware, Phone Hardware, D&C Other and Commercial Other -- had gross margins of 1%, 3%, 24% and 31%, respectively, but contributed even smaller portions to the total gross margin for the quarter. C&G Hardware, for instance, accounted for just 0.1% of the company's gross margin, while Phone -- the new line item in Microsoft's financials that represented the Nokia business acquired in April -- contributed only 0.3% of the gross margin.
As six months ago, when Computerworld last analyzed Microsoft's financials to try to figure out whether its strategy matched its numbers, the four units were not only less profitable than the software groups, but were nearly invisible on the bottom line. Collectively they accounted for 8% of the total gross margin. It's not a rounding error, certainly, but just as obviously not a core part of Microsoft's profitability.
And Nadella has talked "core" so often he could be an apple -- not Apple -- enthusiast.
"We made bold and disciplined decisions to define our core as the productivity and a platform company for the mobile-first, cloud-first world," Nadella said in the July 22 earnings call with Wall Street (emphasis added). "We will get crystal clear on the core businesses that drive long-term differentiation and the businesses that support them."
Nadella used the word "core" 10 times in his prepared statement at the top of that call.
Microsoft, of course, knows full well the profit-making disparity between what it has historically done -- sell software -- and what ex-CEO Steve Ballmer decided it must do, sell devices, too.
While revenue from C&G Hardware, which primarily came from sales of the Xbox game console and Surface tablet, and Phone added $3.4 billion to sales, a closer look at the numbers revealed still-higher costs and continued declining margins for devices.
After an increase in 2014's first quarter, the margin for C&G Hardware took a dive in the second, dropping to just 1%. In the last eight quarters, the group's margins have fallen in four when measured against the previous period.
And the 1% for the second quarter, a record low -- except for the second quarter of 2013, which included a $900 million write-off -- put new meaning to "razor thin."
Microsoft attributed the decline in gross margin for C&G Hardware to higher expenses for both the Xbox and the Surface, but the latter was what dragged down the number: Microsoft took an estimated $363 million loss on the tablet in the June quarter to push the total red ink to $1.7 billion since its October 2012 debut.
Nor did the addition of Nokia help much. With Phone added to C&G Hardware, the two groups returned just 50 cents for each $100 in revenue. When one charts the gross margins of Microsoft's divisions, those for C&G Hardware and Phone are so tiny they simply don't register.
Nadella wasn't unaware of the crummy margins for his company's devices, whether video game machine, tablet or phone. He killed the Surface Mini shortly before it was to launch, reportedly to eat crow immediately rather than to lose even more money down the road; rejected Ballmer's "devices and services" strategy; and talked instead about the company's mission as a "productivity and platforms" seller.